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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
MURRAY FIRST THRIFT &
LOAN CO.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
DWAYNE STEVENSON and
CAROLYN STEVENSON, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
13820

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
This is an action commenced by Plaintiff-Respondent, Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. (hereinafter "Murray") a g a i n s t Defendant-Appellants
Dwayne Stevenson and Carolyn Stevenson, (hereinafter jointly "Stevensons"), whereby Murray sought a
judgment declaring that Murray held a valid security
interest in certain real property pursuant to the terms
of an Assignment of Contract dated September 25,
1973, and executed by Jerry W. Cooper and Candy
Cooper (hereinafter jointly "Coopers"), in favor of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Murray. Stevensons denied that Murray held any interest in said real property and counterclaimed to have
title quieted in themselves.
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT
Murray and Stevensons each filed Motions for
Summary Judgment based upon the pleadings, affidavits and Memorandums of Points and Authorities
on file with the lower court. The lower court entered
its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, and
Judgment which recognized the validity of Murray's
security interest and provided that Stevensons had a
right to pay Murray $7,188.77 within 30 days or pay
said sum over the repayment term of the promissory
note executed by Coopers, and upon compliance with
such terms, Murray would release said security interest.
The Judgment further provided that if Stevensons
failed to comply with said terms, the Motion of Murray
for Summary Judgment would be granted. The lower
court did not enter a Judgment against Stevensons for
the sum of $7,188.77 as asserted by Stevensons in their
Brief.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Murray seeks affirmance of the Judgment entered
by the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts contained in the Brief of
Stevensons is essentially accurate, except for some unDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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warranted conclusions and except for some assertions
of facts which were not determined by the lower court.
The material facts, as determined by the lower court
are hereinafter set forth.
On or about September 24, 1973, Coopers duly
executed and delivered to Murray a renewal promissory
note, whereby they agreed and became obligated to pay
Murray the principal sum of $7,188.77, together with
interest thereon over a term as provided in said note.
To secure the payment of this indebtedness, Coopers
assigned to Murray, pursuant to the terms of that certain Assignment of Contract (hereinafter the "Assignment"), dated September 25, 1973, all of the right, title
and interest of Coopers, as buyers, under the terms of
a certain Uniform Real Estate Contract (hereinafter
the "Contract"), dated August 29, 1967, entered into
by and between Stevensons, as sellers, and Coopers, as
buyers, covering certain real property owned by Stevensons, situated in Salt Lake County, Utah (hereinafter
the "Subject Property"). The Assignment was duly
recorded on September 28, 1973, in the office of the
Salt Lake County Recorder.
The Coopers failed to pay any of the sums which
had become due and owing under said note. On November 20, 1973, Jerry W. Cooper filed a petition in bankruptcy with the United States District Court for the
District of Utah, and on that day he was duly adjudicated a bankrupt. Thereafter, at the first meeting of
creditors on December 11, 1973, the Bankruptcy Court,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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at the request of the parties herein, and pursuant to the
application of Trustee, disclaimed any interest in and
to the Subject Property.
Stevensons were unaware of the Assignment by
Coopers to Murray until said first meeting of creditors.
Murray, at that time, tendered to Stevensons full payment and performance of the obligations of the Coopers
under the Contract. Stevensons refused said tender and
denied that Murray had any right in the Subject Property by reason of said Assignment.
Stevensons refused said tender and denied the interest of Murray on the basis that Coopers had failed
to comply with a sentence, in the body of the paragraph
of the contract which set for the payment schedule, and
which stated:
The buyers agree that they cannot assign, sell
or transfer their initere&t in this Contract without
specific written permission of sellers. . . .
Stevensons thereafter entered into an agreement directly with the Coopers whereby the Coopers attempted
to abandon their interest in the Subject Property.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUBJECT ASSIGNMENT WAS AN
ASSIGNMENT FOR S E C U R I T Y AND
THEREFORE NOT IN DEROGATION OF
THE NON-ASSIGNABILITY CLAUSE.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
Tlic essential argument made by Stevensons in
Points 1 and i i ,.•: ;:k.i Brief is that the non-assignability clause contained in the Contract is legally sufficient to vitiate any assignment, with respect to the interest of Stevensons, including the assignment from
Coopers u* Murray.
As noted above. Coopers assigned their interest in
the Contract to Murray for the purpose of securing
payment of an obligation owing from Coopers. Coopers
w a r to iviiuii possession of the Subject P r o p e r t y and
were obligated to keep the Contract current and in full
force and effect.
C - a 11* i I;;;*-* i raditionally interpreted non-assignability clauses strictly because of the infringement on
the right of alienation of property, and courts have
held that assignments for purposes of securing an obligation are not in derogation of a such a clause. I n 6
C . J . S . Assignments
§ 24(b) it is noted:
As the right of alienation, however, is an incident
of property, the right to make an assignment
can be defeated only by a clear stipulation to
t h a t effect. Further, stipulations against assignment have been held not intended to prevent
assignment as collateral, [emphasis added]
I n t h e case of I 'iht/ji/ntn , . t *- (VM H'csii s n irt/psum
Co., 216 Cal. 420, 14 P.2d 7,)h \i\)'^),
the Court was
considering a MOM-assignability clause contained in a
laese and option «.» purchase. The ( lo\ irt n o t e d :
Ii bat \.\ i.'.v;- • "ilion o* aiilhiMii)' tn th»' piui
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ciple that covenants limiting the free alienation
of property such as covenants against assignment are barely tolerated and must be strictly
construed. . . . [citations omitted]. These cases
and many others that might be cited establish
the rule that it is only a technical assignment
that is prohibited by such covenant. A mortgage
of the lease [in the instant case], of course,
does not constitute a technical assignment. . . .
[A] covenant against assignment is not violated
by the giving of a mortgage [citations omitted].
14 P.2d at 760-761. Also see, Lipsker v. Billings Boot
Shop, 129 Mont. 420, 288 P.2d 660 (1955); Johnston
v. Landucci, 21 Cal. 2d 63, 130 P.2d 405 (1942);
Badger Lumber Co. Parker, 85 Kan. 134, 116 P . 242
(1911).
In the case of Inter-Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 122 Miss. 579, 84 So. 625 (1919), the Court
noted that the assignment in that case was clearly for
purposes of securing payment on a note and that the
assignee did not become the real and unconditional
owner, but that the assig'nor retained the legal ownership. The Court held the assignment valid, notwithstanding a non-assignability clause, and noted:
[W]e find the text book rule to be that stipulations against assignments are not intended to
prevent assignment as collateral. This seems to
be an announcement of the general rule, which
we have found applied in many cases involving
land contracts, insurance policies, etc. . . .
84 So. at 626.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I t is noted that in the cases of Inter-Southern Life
Ins. Co. and Lipsker, supra, the Courts adopted as law
provisions similar to section 70A-9-311, Utah Uniform
Commerial Code, which provides:
The debtor's rights in collaterial may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred (by way of
sale, creation of a security interest, attachment,
levy, garnishment or other judicial process)
notwithstanding a provision in the security
agreement prohibiting any transfer or making
the transfer constitute a default.
In the instant matter, Coopers assigned their interest under the Contract solely for the purpose of securing performance of an obligation in favor of Murray.
Murray acquired no immediate right to possession of
anything but an equity interest in the Subject Property. Therefore, pursuant to the above cited authority,
the assignment from Coopers to Murray was not violative of the non-assignability clause contained in the
Contract.
POINT II.
EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES PROPERLY APPLY TO THE INSTANT MATTER TO DEFEAT FORFEITURE.
In Point I I I of the Brief of Sevensons, it is argued that the lower court erred in granting the relief
framed in the Judgment, which, Stevensons argue, was
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equitable in nature, i.e. specific performance, because
the assignment violated the non-assignability clause.
Stevensons assert equity will not assist a party who is
the sole cause of his own damage. The conclusion of
Stevensons is based solely on the case of Thein v. Silver
Investment Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 308, 196 P.2d 956
(1948). From the facts and conclusions of law of the
Thein case which were recited by Stevensons in their
Brief, it appears that the Court held that an assignee
of a contract cannot avail himself to equitable principles
against the obligor of the original contract when the
contract contained a non-assignability clause. This conclusion from the case as asserted by Stevensons is unequivocally erroneous.
The Court in the Thein case denied the application
of equitable principles, not because an assignment violated a non-assignability clause, but because Mr. Thein
had failed to discharge obligations incurred after the
assignment. The Court noted that the controlling factor in the case was that Thein had no interest in the
property anyway because of the default under the original sales contract and the reentry by Silver and that
Thein had not tendered payment until after said default and reentry.
Therefore, the case law upon which Stevensons
rely to argue Point I I I is not supportive of the conclusions asserted, i.e. violation of a non-assignability
clause defeats application of equity. Furthermore, the
attempted assertion is contrary to established principles
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of equity. In the Official Comments to the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 416, which deals with non-assignability clauses, it is stated:
As restraints dealt with in this section, whether
promissory or forfeiture in form, are primarily
security devices designed to make more certain
the payment of the purchase price, their attempted enforcement by the vendor may, under
certain circumstances, be avoided by the various
equitable doctrines.
The Comments further state, in direct contradiction of
what Stevensons argue:
The assignee may come in and demand specific
performance of the contract of sale, having made
tender of full performance prior to the action....
I t is noted that Murray did in fact tender full performance to Stevensons of the obligations of Coopers.
(See Paragraph 8 of Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.)
Consistent with the above cited Comments to the
Restatement of Property, is the holding in the case of
Jankowski v. Jankowski, 311 Mich. 340, 18 N.W.2d
848 (1945), wherein the Court held that where the vendor had been offered the entire balance owing under a
contract which had been assigned in violation of a nonassignability clause, a Court will not permit forfeiture.
I n the case of Covad v. Noack, 61 Wis.2d 183, 212
N.W.2d 164 (1973), the Court stated:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The nonassignability provision in the land contract is for the benefit of the vendor to safeguard
performance and if performance is tendered the
restriction becomes moot and of no consequence.
To permit enforcement of the non-assignability
provision at this juncture would serve no purpose save for the imposition of a forfeiture upon
the assignee. A court of equity will not permit
such a result. . . . Thus, the courts have ruled
that an assignee of the purchaser of a land contract may commence an action in strict performance under said land contract upon the
tendering of the principal and interest due under
said contract despite the presence of a non-assignment clause in the land contract.
212 N.W.2d at 167.
I t is noted in 55

A M . J U R . VENDOR AND P U R -

CHASER § 432:

[AJccording to the weight of authority, where a
provision against the assignabiMty of a contract
for the sale of land is not followed by any provision for the forfeiture of the contract, the assignment thereof does not operate to forfeit the
contract or confer an excuse for the vendor's
refusal to carry it out, if the obligations of the
vendee under the oontmct are due and have been
fully performed or duly tendered by him or the
assignee. In this respect, the view has been taken
that the assignment is enforceable in equity, notwithstanding the restriction against assignment,
where it appears that the restriction was in the
nature of a mere security for the performance
of the principal covenants, and where such enforcement appears equitable under the circumstances of the case.
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Since Murray did in fact tender full performance,
the lower Court properly would not permit Stevensons
to declare a forfeiture. Any damage or inconvenience
which may have been or may hereafter be incurred by
Stevensons is a direct result of their refusal to accept
the tender by Murray.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED NO
ERROR IN HOLDING THE ASSIGNMENT
CREATED A V A L I D SECURITY INTEREST.
Stevensons argue in Point IV of their Brief that
the Assignment cannot create a security lien in the interest in the Subject Property held by Stevensons.
However, neither the Assignment nor the Judgment entered below creates any right in Murray to any
interest of Stevensons. Murray only obtained the rights
and interest of Coopers by the Assignment, and Murray only obtains such rights as a matter of law. I n 6
A M . JUK. 2d Assignments § 102 it is stated that the
assignee only acquires the rights and interests of the assignor and such rights and interests are subject to any
setoff, claim or defense of the obligor.
Thus, the argument of Stevensons that Murray
could not acquire an interest in the rights of Stevensons
is clearly correct. However, all Murray acquired by
the assignment was a security interest in the equity and
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rights of Coopers and the Judgment of the lower court
only effects the interests of the Coopers. The Judgment
and Assignment do not effect any right, title or interest
of Stevensons.
POINT IV.
VIOLATION OF THE NONASSIGNABILITY CLAUSE DOES NOT ENTITLE STEVENSONS TO DECLARE A FORFEITURE.
In the instant matter, there are two principles
which exist which would defeat the attempt by Stevensons to declare a forfeiture of the Contract and quiet
title in themselves. The first principle is that when a
non-assignability clause is not followed by a clear and
specific forfeiture provision, the vender may not declare
a forfeiture for a violation of such a clause. See general'
ly, 55 A M . Jur. Vendor and Purchaser § 432. In Hull
v. Hostettler, 224 Mich. 365, 194 N.W. 996 (1923),
Court stated that the vendor was not entitled to declare
forfeiture where the non-assignability clause did not
specifically provide that an assignment would constitute a default.
With respect to the Contract between Coopers and
Stevensons, there is no specific reference to the rights
of Stevensons if Coopers should assign their interest.
I t is submitted that in keeping with judicial policy of
strictly construing non-assignability clauses, the nonassignability clause in the Contract must be construed
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as insufficient to warrant forfeiture in the event of assignment. Therefore, the remedy of Stevensons is to
recover damages, if any, from Coopers. See, 30 C.J.S.
Equity § 56(b).
A second principle which would defeat Stevensons
obtaining the relief sought is that equity will not now
permit Stevensons to declare a forfeiture after they
have received a tender of the full performance of the
Contract. As noted above, notwithstanding the violation
of a non-assignability clause, once tender to the vendor
of all obligations of the purchaser is made, equity will
not permit the vendor to thereafter declare a forfeiture.
See supra, Coraci v. Noack, 61 Wis.2d 183, 212 N.W.2d
164 (1973); Jankowski v. Jankowski, 311 Mich. 340,
18 N.W.2d 848 (1945); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §
416, Comment e; 55 A M . JUR. Vendor and Purchaser
§ 432.
Since not permitting a vendor to declare a forfeiture in this matter is essentially equitable, it is interesting to note that the Subject Property was sold to
Coopers for $19,500.0, but was appraised as of November 4, 1973, at $24,000.00, and no doubt has continued
to appreciate. Consequently, there should be sufficient
value to the Subject Property to satisfy both the interests of Murray and Stevensons. To allow Stevensons
to recover the total equity of Coopers amounts to a
windfall, which Stevensons have not earned or for which
they have given any consideration, and to permit such
to occur would clearly prejudice Murray.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CONCLUSION
The relief granted by the lower court was proper
in all respects, if not overly generous to Stevensons.
The Court properly determined that Murray held a
valid security interest in the equity and rights of
Coopers and that the obtaining of such security interest
was not in derogation of the non-assignability clause.
Furthermore, principles of equity would not permit
Stevensons to declare a forfeiture, even if there were
a violation of the non-assignability clause, because a
forfeiture would be a windfall to Stevensons, the nonassignability clause is not followed by a forfeiture provision and because Murray made timely tender to Stevensons in full satisfaction of all obligations of Coopers.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Robert D. Merrill
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent
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